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Abstract: In this article the author proposes a reading of Force of Law from two 
angles: boundless desire and the ‘law’ of language. The author contends that an 
analysis from these perspectives casts new light on the notion of the ‘mystical’, as well 
as repetition, singularity and good/evil as they appear in Derrida’s text. In exploring 
the ‘notion’ of desire, the article focuses specifically on Derrida’s analysis of Freud’s 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle in To Speculate – On Freud where the death drive is 
explored. The author shows the importance of this essay for an understanding of the 
relation between justice and law. The mystical and justice, the author contends, is to 
be understood with reference to the death drive, and repetition or law enforcement as 
its return. Law enforcement could also be viewed in terms of the ‘notion’ of iterability 
in Derrida’s texts on language. These perspectives furthermore allow for an 
understanding of singularity in terms of unconditionality and of justice as beyond 
good and evil.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
In Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority Derrida refers to a number of 
his earlier texts in order to show that his thinking has always been concerned with 
justice.1 One of the texts that he refers to in this regard is a text which appears to have 
little to do with justice, and even less so with law: To Speculate – On “Freud”.2 The 
latter essay involves a detailed reading of Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle3 and 
more specifically reflects on the way in which Freud explores the idea of a death drive. 
In Derrida’s other texts on psychoanalysis this is a ‘theme’ which he comes back to 
consistently.4 The idea of a death drive is not however something which is of 
relevance only for psychoanalysis. Legal scholarship cannot ignore the idea of a death 
drive, seeing that, as Derrida indicates, all organisms, organisations and institutions 
find their ‘origin’ in this drive. Derrida’s essay on Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure 
                                                 
1
 I have relied on the following two publications of the English translation(s) (both by Mary Quaintance) of this 
text: Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority”, in: Deconstruction and the 
Possibility of Justice, eds. Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld and David Gray Carlson, 1992, 3-67 (hereafter 
referred to as ‘Force of Law (1)’), and Jacques Derrida, Acts of Religion, 2002, 230-298 (hereafter referred to as 
‘Force of Law (2)’). The first of these texts corresponds in all substantial respects with the French and English 
versions that appeared in the Cardozo Law Review 11 (1989-1990), 920-1045 as well as with the German 
translation; see Jacques Derrida, Gesetzeskraft: Der “mystische Grund der Autorität”, 1991. The second text is 
an extended version, based on the 1994 French version. The reference to two texts in what follows is made 
necessary by the differences between them. The text that will be relied on primarily is the extended version, 
Force of Law (2).  
2
 Jacques Derrida, The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond, 1987. For the references to this text, see 
Force of Law (2), 235, Force of Law (1), 7. 
3
 See Sigmund Freud The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol XVIII, 
2001, 7. 
4
 The reader is requested to pardon the frequent use that will be made of quotation marks in this article when 
referring to certain concepts. As those who know Derrida’s texts will already be aware, this is not done for 
arbitrary reasons, as should also appear from the further discussion. 
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Principle has thus far received little attention in legal scholarship.5 This is 
unfortunate and has led to many misunderstandings in relation to Force of Law. The 
same can be said concerning Derrida’s explorations of what could be termed the ‘law’ 
of language. It is the topic of numerous texts of Derrida, and in Force of Law he links 
the ‘problem of language’ explicitly to ‘the question of justice’.6  
This article will seek to address the confoundedness, especially in legal scholarship, 
which has accompanied Force of Law since its first publication.7 This, it is submitted, 
has often been a result of attempting to read Force of Law as an isolated essay with 
insufficient regard for Derrida’s broader oeuvre.8 As a consequence, a number of 
important issues in Force of Law have remained at least partly unexplored. These 
include the idea of the ‘mystical’ foundation of law, as well as the ‘notions’ of 
iterability, singularity, undecidability, and the problem of good and evil. Derrida’s 
reading of Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle is particularly helpful in clarifying 
these issues, more specifically the mystical and iterability. The mystical, it will be 
contended, must be understood with reference to what could also be referred to as 
boundless desire. The role of such desire in law as well as that of iterability is shown 
by Derrida’s contemplations on the death drive as well as the fort/da game which 
Freud analyses in Beyond the Pleasure Principle. The analysis of the law of language 
also assists in understanding the ‘notion’ of iterability. Thinking about the notions of 
the mystical and iterability in the way described in detail below, furthermore makes it 
easier to understand what Derrida means with singularity as well as to determine the 
relationship between justice and good and evil. Both for reasons of space and for 
structural reasons this cannot be an exhaustive reading of Force of Law.9 The present 
article will nonetheless seek to and will hopefully succeed at least partly in providing 
some markers that could be helpful in further explorations of this remarkable text of 
Derrida. 
 
2. Derrida on desire and language10 
 
a) Fort/da 
 
The most well-known part of Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle is the second 
chapter where he recounts his observation of the ‘game’ of his grandson Ernst (at the 
time one and a half years of age) with a wooden spool with a piece of string tied 
around it during a family vacation.11 Ernst had the ‘disturbing habit’, Freud 
comments, of throwing small objects away from him into a corner, under the bed, and 
                                                 
5
 The exception is provided by Drucilla Cornell, The Doubly-Prized World: Myth, Allegory and the Feminine, 
Cornell Law Review 75 (1990) 644; and Drucilla Cornell, Law and the Postmodern Mind: Rethinking the 
Beyond of the Real, Cardozo Law Review 16 (1995) 729. In the non-legal context, this essay has received more 
attention; see e.g. Christopher Norris, Derrida, 1987, 206-213; Marian Hobson, Jacques Derrida: Opening 
Lines, 1998, 164-182; Gregory L. Ulmer, Review: The Post-Age, Diacritics 11:3 (1981), 39; Andrea Loselle, 
Freud/Derrida as Fort/Da and the Repetitive Eponym, MLN 97:5 (1982), 1180; Samuel Weber, Institution and 
Interpretation, 2001, 85-131. 
6
  See Force of Law (2), 245, Force of Law (1), 17. 
7
 This can of course not be said with regard to all commentaries that have appeared on Force of Law. 
8
 This has unfortunately not stopped many legal scholars from criticising or dismissing that which they often 
have no at most a very superficial understanding of.  
9
 See Jacques Derrida and Maurizio Ferraris, A Taste for the Secret, 2001, 31-32 on the excess within Derrida’s 
texts. 
10
 This section may be difficult for the reader to follow at first. Although what is discussed in section 2 should 
logically follow after the introduction, it could also be (re)read after having first read section 3, which should 
also make the relevance of the explorations in section 2 clear.  
11
 Freud (note 3), 14; Derrida (note 2), 307 
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so on. It was not easy work for the parents, Freud notes, to collect these toys again.12 
In dispersing his toys like this Ernst uttered the sound ‘“o-o-o-o”, accompanied by an 
expression of interest and satisfaction’, as Freud describes it, and which Freud and 
Sophie13 understood as the German word fort (gone, far away).14 Freud will 
eventually interpret this disturbing habit as a ‘game’ and as part of the whole or 
complete fort/da game. Ernst had another game (the well-known and ‘complete’ one) 
of throwing a spool over the railing of his little veiled bed while uttering loudly the 
sound ‘o-o-o-o’ and pulling it from out of the bed back towards him, uttering joyfully 
the sound ‘da’ (there). Freud observes that the greatest pleasure for Ernst lay in the 
return of the spool.15 Ernst also had another game, making himself disappear when 
playing with his own mirror-image. This he did by watching his reflection in the 
mirror and then crouching so that he could no longer see himself in the mirror which 
did not reach to the ground.16 Upon the return of Sophie, after ‘several hours’ of 
absence and a ‘long period of solitude’, as Freud notes, she was met by the words 
‘Baby [Bebi] o-o-o-o’ from Ernst.17 For Freud this is also part of the fort/da game.  
Freud’s interpretation of the fort/da game is that Ernst seeks to compensate himself 
for a great cultural achievement - his own renunciation of instinctual satisfaction – of 
allowing his mother to leave the house without protestation. The question this 
however raises is why Ernst would repeat what seems to have been an unpleasant 
experience for him. It could possibly be argued, Freud contends, that as the pleasure 
lay in the return, the departure had to be enacted as a necessary preliminary to this 
return and that the re-enactment of the joyful return was the true aim of the game.18 
This would not however explain the fact that the distancing (the mother’s departure 
being disagreeable) was performed more often than the return (the agreeable part), 
and as a game in itself, as Freud himself notes.19 Freud’s first attempted solution of 
this ‘mystery’ is to speculate that even though Ernst repeats an unpleasant experience 
- the absence of his mother - this is done in order to master her absence. What was 
first of all a passive experience is thus turned into a game in which Ernst plays an 
active part even though the game repeats an unpleasant experience. Freud attributes 
Ernst’s actions to an instinct for mastery, acting independently of whether or not the 
memory in itself was pleasurable.20 Freud’s second attempt at a solution is to view the 
pleasure principle as fulfilling a negative function. Distancing his toys would in other 
words be pleasurable for Ernst. He would thereby be taking revenge on his mother for 
going away, implicitly saying to her: ‘All right, then, go away! I don’t need you. I’m 
sending you away myself’.21 Freud clearly prefers the solution which links Ernst’s 
actions to an instinct of mastery independent of the pleasure principle, but 
nevertheless concludes ‘that no certain decision [on a beyond of the pleasure 
                                                 
12
 Derrida (note 2), 309 
13
 Sophie was Ernst’s mother and Freud’s (favourite) daughter, referred to by Derrida (note 2), 306 as the ‘mute 
daughter’, the significance of which should appear from the discussion below, where we will similarly refer to 
the death drive’s silence. 
14
 Freud (note 3), 14-15; Derrida (note 2), 310 
15
 Freud (note 3), 15; Derrida (note 2), 313, 318 
16
 Freud (note 3), 15 n 1; Derrida (note 2) 318-9 
17
 Freud (note 3), 15 n 1 
18
 Ibid 15-16 
19
 Freud (note 3), 16; Derrida (note 2), 324 
20
 Freud (note 3), 16; Derrida (note 2), 325; Derrida notes the strangeness of this interpretation, seeing that it is 
based on the idea that ‘mastery’ amounts to a beyond of the pleasure principle, something which does not 
correspond with some of Freud’s other texts where the pleasure principle is equated with mastery; see Derrida 
(note 2), 325. See further section 3(d) below. 
21
 Freud (note 3), 16; Derrida (note 2), 326 
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principle] can be reached from the analysis of a single case like this’, thereby 
effectively confirming the domination of the pleasure principle.22  
 
b) The death drive 
 
The above game will be an important part of our reflections, especially in the 
discussion below of law-preserving violence/power as it appears in Force of Law. For 
the present discussion it is important to first take note of the broader context within 
which the game is recounted by Freud. Based on the observation that his patients 
tend to repeat unpleasant experiences, both in dreams and in the analytic situation by 
repeating childhood events through transference, which appear to reflect a 
mysterious masochistic trend in the ego, Freud questions the common assumption 
that the pleasure principle (PP)23 dominates in the psyche.24 Freud for this reason 
reflects on the origins of life. He notes that it was through external disturbing forces 
that inorganic states were transformed into living entities.25 The tension which in this 
way arose in the organism which had until then been inanimate must have tried to 
cancel itself out. In this way the first instinct came into effect, namely to return to the 
inorganic state. This instinct has not remained restricted to the first life forms, Freud 
contends. All organisms primarily still seek to return to the inorganic state in the 
form of detours of longer or shorter duration.26 This latter function is performed by 
the conservative drives in the ego which seek to make the organism die its own death, 
in other words, of natural causes, and keep the organism away from anything that 
might prevent this from happening.27 They in other words serve to ensure that the 
organism does not go directly towards death.28 The conservative (ego) drives in the 
organism are nevertheless merely secondary processes which ultimately serve the 
primary psychical process or what could be termed a death drive.29  
To be noted is that Freud does not adopt or accept the notion of a death drive as a 
thesis for psychoanalysis. He sends it away again or casts doubt on its ‘existence’ each 
time after having considered its possibility.30 Particularly insofar as the description 
above is concerned, Freud casts doubt on the ‘existence’ of a death drive because of 
his view that the sexual instincts (the ‘true life instincts’) stand in opposition to the 
conservative (ego) drives/instincts.31 Whereas the sexual instincts are directed 
towards an object, the conservative instincts serve the self-preservation of the 
individual.32 The sexual instincts cannot in other words be said to be linked to the 
death drive, Freud contends, seeing that they make the task of ceasing to live more 
difficult. Only the conservative instincts would thus be linked to a compulsion to 
repeat.33 Freud later nevertheless acknowledges that even the ego or conservative 
                                                 
22
 Freud (note 3), 16; Derrida (note 2), 294, 295, 324 
23
 Derrida uses the abbreviation PP to refer to the pleasure principle as well to Freud as grandfather (Pépé); see 
Derrida (note 2), 287 n 18, and 298; and Jacques Derrida Glas, 1986, 176b. Derrida (note 2), 275 points out that 
the ‘pleasure principle’ is an interesting translation of what Freud calls the Lustprinzip; Lust of course refers also 
to erotic enjoyment [jouissance] and desire. This dimension is lost in the English translation. 
24
 Freud (note 3), 13-14, 36 
25
 Ibid 36, 38 
26
 Ibid 38-39 
27
 Ibid 39 
28
 Ibid 
29
 Ibid 34, 39 
30
 See e.g. ibid 59. 
31
 Ibid 39-41; the ego instincts, Freud notes later on (at 51), were at first thought to function ‘only as a repressive, 
censoring agency, capable of erecting protective structures and reactive formations’. 
32
 Ibid 50-51 
33
 Ibid 44, 57 
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instincts (or at least a part thereof) have a libidinal nature as can be seen from 
narcissism where the libido is withdrawn from the object and directed on to the 
subject’s own ego.34 From studying the libidinal development of children in its 
earliest stages it also becomes clear that the ego is the ‘true and original reservoir of 
the libido’.35 It therefore appears that the libido is extended from the ego on to 
objects, the ego itself being one of the primary sexual objects.36 In order not to have to 
agree with Jung’s (libidinal) monism, and in order to account for sadism (the sexual 
injury of a love-object, in spite of the life instincts aiming at the preservation of life) 
as well as masochism, Freud however rejects the idea that all instincts are libidinal in 
nature and insists on retaining an opposition between life instincts and death 
instincts.37 This was despite his dissatisfaction with the latter hypothesis. 
Notwithstanding his difficulty in solving the relation between the instinctual 
processes of repetition and the dominance of the pleasure principle, and his inability 
to provide proof of the existence of a death drive, Freud expresses his personal 
preference for the notion of a death drive in order to explain psychical processes.38 
Derrida could be said to succeed in solving Freud’s dilemma of explaining the relation 
between the ego and sexual drives/instincts as well as the life and death 
drives/instincts.39 Briefly stated, according to Derrida there is no opposition between 
life (instincts) and death (instincts). There is instead a differantial relation between 
the primary and the secondary processes that Freud describes. There is therefore also 
no opposition between the sexual instincts and the conservative or ego instincts as 
Freud at some point asserts, but later substitutes with an opposition between life and 
death instincts.40 Instead, the conservative and sexual instincts are in a differantial 
relation with the death drive or absolute pleasure, also referred to by Derrida as ‘final 
orgasm’.41 As Freud furthermore indicated, the mental apparatus, already during the 
primary process, restricts itself independent of but actually in service of the pleasure 
principle and its delegate, the reality principle.42 At this stage no account is taken of 
the development of unpleasure.43 Insofar as the secondary process is concerned, it is 
ruled by the pleasure principle, but as a satellite of the death drive. The secondary 
process is in other words a supplementary process of binding.44 The process can be 
depicted as follows (the line between the two, indicative of the zone of différance): 
 
 Pleasure Principle (PP) + Reality Principle (PR)    
    primary process (pp) 
 
                                                 
34
 Ibid 51-52; see also Sigmund Freud, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund 
Freud vol XVI, 2001, 415-416 (The Libido Theory and Narcissism). 
35
 Freud (note 3), 51 
36
 Ibid 51-52 
37
 Ibid 52-55, 61; and Sigmund Freud The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund 
Freud  vol XXI 118-119 (Civilization and its Discontents); Derrida (note 2), 366-8. 
38
  Freud (note 3), 59-60; Derrida (note 2), 385 
39
 It should perhaps be pointed out that Derrida’s reading of the Freudian death drive is very different from that 
of scholars such as Lacan, Žižek and Douzinas; see e.g. Jacques Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 1992, 253-
268; Slavoj Žižek, A Plea for a Return to Différance (with a Minor Pro Domo Sua, Critical Inquiry 32:2 (2006), 
226-249 at 245; and Costas Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism, 
2007, 47. 
40
 Freud (note 3), 61 
41
 Derrida, (note 2), 361-376, 396-405, 408; see also Freud (note 3), 10 and Freud (note 34), 355-356 on the 
difficulty in educating the sexual instincts. 
42
 Freud (note 3), 32, 34-35, 62 
43
 Ibid 62 
44
 Derrida (note 2), 394-395 
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Death is therefore always already a part of life, although life hides this from itself.45 
This is not a place in the psyche, but a non-place which is ‘decreed by a sworn 
pledge’.46 We are therefore already dead in accordance with this life-death ‘stricture’, 
or stated differently, ‘We do not await death, we only desire it as a past we have not 
yet lived, that we have forgotten’.47 The relation between the drives or instincts in 
Freud thus becomes the movement of différance in Derrida’s text.  
 
c) The law of language 
 
Derrida’s reading of Freud is tied to his earlier explorations of the ‘law’ of language. 
The importance of Derrida’s earlier thinking on the relation between speech and 
writing is often referred to simply as illustration of deconstruction at work. The 
exploration of the relation between speech and writing holds also a greater 
significance for legal thinking. Derrida’s analysis in this regard, which can only very 
briefly be summarised here, is essential to understand the life-death stricture and 
therefore also the relation between law and justice.48 It is because of the illusion of 
and desire for self-presence (or proximity to the mind and of the mind to things) that 
speech has been privileged in the metaphysical tradition since Plato. This is because 
speech seemingly has a sense of immediacy which is absent in the materiality of 
writing. The words/signifiers used in speech seem to disappear the moment they are 
uttered. Speech thus seems to be able to ensure the pure expression of a signified 
(meaning) and of thought, perfect understanding, and direct access to truth. Writing 
on the other hand has been viewed in the metaphysical tradition as a mere secondary 
representation of and as external to speech which is already a full presence. Writing 
in this sense is a deviation from nature, leading to forgetfulness, and bearing the risk 
of misinterpretation as it can continue to function and can be read by anyone at a 
time when the author is no longer present so as to correct misunderstandings. 
Writing has in other words become a synonym for the betrayal of life, for dead or 
empty repetition, as well as for the corruption of self-present meaning, thinking and 
truth.49 Those philosophers who have condemned writing have however in the same 
breath indicated its necessity and its ‘originary’ character, usually in a non-thematic 
way.50 The relation with the description above of the death drive should be clear: the 
repression of writing in favour of speech/presence can in psychoanalytic terms be 
explained as the ‘symptom’ of a fear of the threat of what is already lodged inside 
speech/presence and which, as we will see just now, writing is already a supplement 
for - the desire for absolute pleasure, for death.51  
Derrida proceeds to show that what is usually said critically of writing can also be said 
of speech (as well as of silent reflection).52 As speech entails the use of signifiers in the 
same way as writing, the pure presence to a subject of thoughts or ideas cannot be at 
the origin of speech/writing. If not self-presence, what then makes language possible? 
                                                 
45
 See also Freud (note 3), 63. 
46
 See Jacques Derrida and Anne Dufourmantelle, Of Hospitality, 2000, 119. 
47
 Derrida (note 23), 79b, 84b 
48
 See in general Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, 1974; Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc, 1988; Jacques Derrida, 
Dissemination, 2004; Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, 1973. 
49
 See e.g. Derrida (note 48), Dissemination, 136-137. 
50
 See e.g. Derrida (note 48), Of Grammatology, 52-53, 142-143, 245-246; Derrida (note 48), Dissemination, 
156-157. 
51
 See Derrida (note 48), Of Grammatology, 56; Derrida’s approach should nonetheless not be confused with 
psychoanalysis as it precedes psychoanalysis (at 159-161); see also Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, 
2001, 246-250. 
52
  See Derrida (note 48), Speech and Phenomena, 70-87. 
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This ‘law’ is already shown in the above description of writing. For a sign to be able to 
function, it has to be distinguishable from other signs and repeatable in different 
contexts at another time even if the author or the first reader(s) is no longer present, 
and more specifically, when they are dead.53 Repetition, as essential feature of writing 
and speech, always involves a kind of mechanization.54 Language, we could also say, 
is already worked through by the machine (the sign, repetition), becoming 
independent from its origin.55 The functioning of signs56 is therefore not dependent 
on the self-presence of a speaking subject, but on their iterability.57 Iterability refers 
to the ability of signs to function in or be grafted onto other contexts and also to 
function in the event of the death of their ‘producer’, risking thereby - not as a chance 
but as a structural necessity – the loss of self-presence, of meaning, of readability, of 
property. ‘All graphemes’, Derrida notes, ‘are of a testamentary essence’.58 The 
condition of possibility or law of language described here is clearly very similar to the 
life-death stricture of différance described above. This similarity appears also in 
Derrida’s response to a question in relation to the experience of language:  
 
It is a matter of life in the sense that life is not separable from an experience of 
death….[T]he life of language is also the life of specters…a spectrality proper to the 
body of language. Language, the word – in a way, the life of the word – is in essence 
spectral. It is a little like the date: it repeats itself, as itself, and is every time other. 
There is a sort of spectral virtualization in the being of the word, in the very being of 
grammar. And it is therefore within language already, right on the tongue, that the 
experience of life-death makes itself felt.59 
 
Our relation to ourselves and to others is thus not one of self presence. The desire for 
presence inevitably has to pass through and is made possible by technics or the 
machine, whether in the form of language, the psyche or of some other kind.60 The 
psyche as we saw is structured by the death drive or unbounded pleasure and 
language similarly entails a structure of dispossession. These two structures are 
furthermore closely related, as the desire for self-destruction ‘is’ also the pre-origin of 
                                                 
53
 Derrida (note 48), Limited Inc, 8, 48 
54
 Jacques Derrida: An Interview with, Word Processing, Oxford Literary Review 21 (2000), 3 at 4. 
55
 Jacques Derrida, Archive Fever in South Africa, in: Refiguring the Archive, eds. Carolyn Hamilton et al, 2002, 
38 at 54. 
56
 The notion of the sign and therefore necessarily of the signifier and signified is put in question by Derrida 
(note 48), Of Grammatology, 19 read with n 9 and replaced with the notion of the ‘mark’. See also Derrida and 
Ferraris (note 9), 76 where Derrida refers to the mark as not anthropological and as prelinguistic. 
57
 Derrida (note 48), Limited Inc, 12; see also Sascha Bischof, Gerechtigkeit – Verantwortung – 
Gastfreundschaft: Ethik-Ansätze nach Jacques Derrida, 2004, 123-155 for an excellent analysis. This law of 
language can also be referred to as the arche-trace (Derrida (note 48), Of Grammatology, 46-47, 61-65, 70, 
arche-writing (at 56, 60) or différance (at 62) which refer to an absolute past (at 66, 70). In response to the 
remarks of Giorgio Agamben, Language and Death, 1991, 38-40, concerning Derrida and the overcoming of 
metaphysics with reference to what Agamben refers to as the gramma, it needs to be pointed out that the grammè 
(or arche-writing) in Derrida’s thinking should not be confused with writing in the narrow sense.  
58
 Derrida (note 48), Of Grammatology, 69, also at 184: ‘Imagination is at bottom the relationship with death’. 
59
 Jacques Derrida, Sovereignties in Question: The Poetics of Paul Celan, 2005, 103-104; see also Derrida (note 
48), Of Grammatology, 141: ‘The speculary dispossession which at the same time institutes and deconstitutes me 
is also a law of language. It operates as a power of death in the heart of living speech: a power all the more 
redoubtable because it opens as much as it threatens the possibility of the spoken word.’ 
60
 See Jacques Derrida and Elisabeth Roudinesco, For What Tomorrow…A Dialogue, 2004, 47-61 for a lucid 
exposition of Derrida’s relation with the machine, and for helpful commentaries on this aspect of Derrida’s texts, 
see Michael Naas, Comme si, comme ça: Phantasms of Self, State, and a Sovereign God, Mosaic 40:2 (2007) 1; 
and Patricia Ticineto Clough, The Technical Substrates of Unconscious Memory: Rereading Derrida’s Freud in 
the Age of Teletechnology, Sociological Theory, 18:3 (2000), 383. 
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language.61 Unbounded desire or the death drive therefore necessarily plays in on the 
structure of language (co-structures it). The functioning of the psyche can at the same 
time be described with reference to a writing machine or even tele-technology, 
provided one is aware of that which exceeds calculation in the machine.62 The 
implications of this for the legal system (another kind of technics/machine)63 are 
what Derrida explores in Force of Law. 
 
3. Re-reading Force of Law64 
 
a) The mystical foundation of authority 
 
i) Part I 
 
Legal scholars have thus far often read the phrase ‘the mystical foundation of 
authority’ from the title of Force of Law as if Derrida merely contends that the law is 
based on violence and therefore is ultimately without foundation or justification. 
Considering this phrase in light of the above exploration of the death drive and of 
language, allows for another perspective. In Force of Law, Derrida explores this 
phrase with reference to the writings of Montaigne and Pascal, and later also of 
Benjamin.65 The passage from Montaigne reads as follows: 
 
Lawes are now maintained in credit, not because they are just, but because they are 
lawes. It is the mystical foundation of their authority; they have none other … 
Whosoever obeyeth them because they are just, obeyes them not justly the way as he 
ought.66 
 
Derrida, in his analysis of this phrase, emphasises the fact that the founding of a state 
takes place through a performative force which is neither just nor unjust and which 
cannot be guaranteed, contradicted or invalidated by justice or by any previously 
founding law or pre-existing foundation.67 Law is not simply in the service of force 
and thus exterior to some dominant power, but it stands in an internal, more complex 
relation to force, power or violence, Derrida contends.68 Since the origin of authority, 
the foundation or positing of law, rests only upon itself, it is a violence/power without 
ground.69 This is also the case where a new constitution is adopted on the basis of an 
earlier one, as in the case of the last such founding act, the same groundless violence 
will appear.70 Where international law appears to guarantee the legitimacy of the 
founding of a state, the same also applies, as the rules of international law are also a 
                                                 
61
 See Jacques Derrida, Monolingualism of the Other; or, The Prosthesis of Origin, 1998, 21-22 where Derrida 
notes that ‘an immanent structure of promise or desire…informs all speech’. This promise is a threatening 
promise, promising the impossible; see at 67-68, 73. 
62
 See Derrida (note 51), 246-291; Derrida and Roudinesco (note 60), 58. 
63
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violence/power without ground.71 This does not however mean that law is completely 
without ‘foundation’. The positing of law, Derrida contends with reference to its 
status as neither legal nor illegal, exceeds the opposition between founded and 
unfounded, foundationalism and anti-foundationalism.72 In this brief analysis we can 
already see the same questions of ‘origin’ lurking as in Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle. 
One of the first clear signs of an overlap of Force of Law with To Speculate – On 
Freud and with the discussion of the law of language above appears when Derrida 
notes that in the ‘violent structure of the founding act’ of law or of a state, there is ‘a 
silence walled up’ and that this silence is ‘walled up, walled in because…[it] is not 
exterior to language’.73 He continues by saying that this is what he means by the 
mystical foundation of authority.74 When Derrida refers to justice in terms of an 
experience of aporia or of the impossible, he again alludes to the notion of the 
mystical.75 The mystical foundation of authority is therefore clearly a reference to 
justice,76 which has to be understood in relation to the ‘notion’ of boundless desire 
referred to above in the discussion of the death instinct.77 Another reference to the 
relation between justice and the death drive can be seen in Derrida’s reference to the 
suspension of law as an ‘anguishing moment of suspense’.78 The following passage’s 
correlation with the differantial stricture of life-death as described above in the 
context of Derrida’s reading of Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle, requires no 
further comment: 
 
Everything would still be simple if this distinction between justice and law were a true 
distinction, an opposition the functioning of which was logically regulated and 
masterable. But it turns out that law claims to exercise itself in the name of justice 
and that justice demands for itself that it be established in the name of a law that 
must be put to work [mis en oeuvre] (constituted and applied) by force “enforced”. 
Deconstruction always finds itself and moves itself between these two poles.79  
 
As was explained above, two ‘laws’ or ‘desires’ can be said to be at stake in life death, 
this unity being inhibited at the origin.80 The one: the organism dying its own death, 
thereby emphasising the proper and the oikos; and the other, hidden from the self: 
returning to the inorganic state. These laws or desires are evident in Force of Law in 
the distinction that Derrida draws between justice and law (the consequence of the 
conservative drives) and can also be recognised in his analysis of hospitality where he 
distinguishes between absolute hospitality or just hospitality on the one hand, and 
hospitality in a restricted sense on the other.81 
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In the founding of law, Derrida notes somewhat later on in words which cannot but 
remind us of his reflections in To Speculate – On Freud, the ‘problem of justice will 
have been posed and violently resolved, that is to say buried, dissimulated, 
repressed’.82 This repression can also be described as an expulsion or rejection of that 
which the body politic does not tolerate, that which threatens it or that it feels to be a 
threat.83 It is for the same reasons that Derrida invokes the unconscious, or at least 
something unconscious,84 in discussing the third aporia, describing the instant of a 
just decision as ‘a madness; a madness because such a decision is both hyper-active 
and suffered [sur-active et subie], it preserves something passive, even unconscious, 
as if the deciding one was free only by letting himself be affected by his own decision 
and as if it came to him from the other’.85 In Derrida’s description of justice we can 
also clearly see allusions to the repressed memory traces of the inorganic state or 
absolute jouissance in his reading of Beyond the Pleasure Principle: 
 
[T]his ‘idea of justice’ seems indestructible in its affirmative character, in its demand 
of gift without exchange, without circulation, without recognition or gratitude, 
without economic circularity, without calculation and without rules, without reason 
and without theoretical rationality, in the sense of regulating mastery. And so, one 
can recognize in it, even accuse in it a madness, and perhaps another kind of 
mysticism [une autre sorte de mystique].86 
 
Justice thus entails incalculable disproportion and a loss or an expropriation of the 
proper, of property, of economy, of rights, the suspension of law in other words.87 The 
‘desire’ for justice or the mystical limit appears and is repressed at the origin of every 
institution and as we will see later, comes to the fore again in its conservation.88 With 
reference to what Derrida says in Glas concerning the first moment of natural religion 
in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, the founding of law or of a state can be said to be 
a monument put forth to guard, to monumentalise the trace of death.89 The people in 
the moment of revolution, devoid of self, without any body proper, without property, 
propriety, truth, without sense, in consuming self-destruction, preserves itself in 
losing itself in appearing through this founding.90 This clearly ties in with Derrida’s 
statement in To Speculate – On Freud that ‘[e]very being-together…begins by 
binding-itself, by a binding-itself in a differantial relation to itself’.91 As should be 
clear, this also corresponds with what was said above regarding the binding which 
takes place already in the primary process in the service of the pleasure principle.92 
The same hidden memory or ‘mystical limit’ that we saw operates in the case of 
‘living’ organisms, is thus also to be found at the origin of law or of a state. As we will 
see below, through repetition, those who write legal judgments and those who take 
political decisions on the authority of constitutions are inevitably affected by the same 
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erased memory traces.93 In To Speculate – On Freud Derrida already pointed out that 
what is said regarding the self applies to every living organism, every corpus, every 
movement, every organization and therefore also to state law.94 At the ‘origin’ of law, 
at the origin of a constitution, in a similar way as the institution of psychoanalysis, we 
could say, lies an erased or suppressed trace of justice95 or of a return to the inorganic 
state.96 A constitution may in other words appear to speak only of law or a restricted 
economy, but if one reads it with a ‘responsibility toward memory’, it speaks also of 
justice, of absolute hospitality.97 Derrida more specifically calls for this when he 
speaks of justice in terms of a ‘responsibility without limits, and so necessarily 
excessive, incalculable, before memory’.98  
 
ii) Part II 
 
In the second part of Force of Law, when Derrida continues with his analysis of the 
mystical, the correlation with his analysis of the Freudian death drive can also clearly 
be seen. In spite of other differences between them that will be referred to below, 
Derrida expresses his agreement with Benjamin’s contention that law is inherently 
violent and that the state seeks to have a monopoly on violence.99 The state fears 
fundamental, founding violence most of all as this kind of violence could ultimately 
present itself as having the right to found a new law.100 The violence that founds law 
is not alien to law, Derrida notes, following Benjamin, but that in law which suspends 
law; an instance of non-law in law.101 This is of course related to Benjamin’s 
interpretation of the right to strike which is a right that modern legal systems grant to 
workers which can be relied on in a general strike, Benjamin contends, to abolish law 
and to found a new law. Derrida extends this idea by contending that by means of 
modern technology something similar to a general strike can be brought about 
without having to mobilise great numbers of people.102 With reference to Derrida’s 
other texts, it could be said that this right to law or the right to found new law is not 
restricted to the right to strike, but to be implied also in other fundamental rights 
guaranteed in a constitution such as the right to equality, which potentially comes 
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into play in every interpretive reading.103 The founding of law or of a state is 
terrifying, Derrida notes, inter alia because these moments of founding are in 
themselves and in their violence uninterpretable or indecipherable (an ungraspable 
revolutionary instant).104 He then explicitly links this with the notion of ‘mystique’.105 
This is to be understood with reference to the way in which the violence that is used 
in order to found a new state is justified in revolution: by relying on the future 
anterior. The in-progress or to-come founding of a new law is said to now already 
justify the illegal violence that is currently taking place.106 The mystical is in other 
words that instance of non-law in law which suspends established law in order to 
found another law.107 This moment, Derrida says - 
 
always takes place and never takes place in a presence. It is the moment in which 
the foundation of law remains suspended in the void or over the abyss, suspended by 
a pure performative act that would not have to answer to or before anyone. The 
supposed subject of this pure performative would no longer be before the law [devant 
la loi], or rather he would be before a law [loi] still undetermined, before the law as 
before a law nonexisting, a law still ahead, still having to and yet to come [une loi 
encore devant et devant venire].108   
 
This is a difficult passage and creates the impression that Derrida is saying that the 
law, in the sense of the legal system, always remains to come, in a similar way in 
which he would in other texts for example refer to democracy to come.109 We cannot 
engage here in a lengthy analysis of Derrida’s reading of Kafka’s Before the Law, 
which Derrida also refers to here, but it is important to note that the law that Derrida 
refers to in his essay Before the Law is not to be equated with the legal system, but 
rather with desire or what in Force of Law would be referred to as justice and which 
as Derrida notes, ‘remains to come, it remains by coming [la justice reste à venire], it 
has to come [elle a à venire] it is to come, the to-come [elle est à-venir], it deploys the 
very dimension of events irreducibly to come’.110 What is at stake in the above 
(indented) passage, as the context makes clear, is the suspension of law in order to 
found a new law. Nevertheless, this founding of a new law is ‘based’ on what Derrida 
refers to as an ‘anterior law’ and which is given the figure of the general strike (and 
also of war) in Benjamin’s text.111 Benjamin expresses a similar idea through the 
notion of divine violence or divine justice which is without means that look to an end, 
which Derrida also refers to in terms of the mystical foundation of authority.112 What 
Derrida admires about this thinking of Benjamin, he says, is its acknowledgment that 
there can be no justice and no responsibility without an exposure to all risks, beyond 
certitude and good conscience.113 Derrida however distances himself from the 
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(bloodless) divine violence which Benjamin ascribes to justice, its complete 
separation from law, and the notion of the divine as sovereign.114 The stricture of 
différance which Derrida insists on should be clear from this objection and from 
Derrida’s description of the relation between law and justice. For Derrida, justice is as 
for Benjamin an ‘anterior law’ and not of the order of knowledge; justice for Derrida 
is indissociable from law and yet without sovereignty.115  
 
b) Repetition and law-enforcing violence 
 
The notion of the mystical as well as that of repetition could be clarified further when 
we consider Derrida’s interpretation of Ernst’s game, as recounted in Freud’s Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle. Derrida’s reading is that Ernst is effectively dispersing himself 
or perhaps even being dispersed in these games.116 In the second game, as we saw, he 
throws the spool (representing Sophie) into his veiled bed. The bed, Derrida 
contends, is fort, and throwing the spool into the veil, expresses Ernst’s desire for 
absolute pleasure or pleasure without end.117 This is not to be understood as an 
oedipal desire or even a desire to return to the mother’s womb, but the absolute 
desire of a return to the inorganic state, or an immense orgiastic jouissance, Sophie 
here representing death.118 Sophie, in other words, is already a substitute for that 
which is ultimately desired. This desire is described as follows by Derrida: 
 
We do not await death, we only desire it as a past we have not yet lived, that we have 
forgotten, but with a forgetfulness that has not come to cover over an experience, with 
a memory more ample, more capable, older than any perception.119 
 
The same desire is also expressed in Freud’s text, hiding the fact from himself that he 
is Ernst’s grandfather, by writing on Ernst’s game, and recalling Sophie, his favourite 
daughter who died in January 1920, of influenza, at the time of his writing of Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle.120 Freud, in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, appears to send 
away the pleasure principle like Ernst does with the spool, but each time brings it 
back to himself.121 Ernst is in other words not the inventor of these games as Freud at 
one point contends.122 The game(s) as described by Freud instead show that absolute 
desire which precedes Ernst as a subject is the ‘origin’ thereof. It is in a sense the 
game that repeats itself, using Ernst as one figure among others, in which he is picked 
up and hurled.123 The return of the toys, the spool, and Ernst in each the three games, 
comes in order to disrupt the pleasure principle, or as Derrida puts it, ‘to mine the PP 
as its proper stranger, to hollow it into an abyss from the vantage of an origin more 
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original than it and independent of it, older than it within it’.124 The answer to Freud’s 
question on the repetition of ‘unpleasant’ experiences, and here in particular the 
repetition that is at stake in Ernst’s games, is in other words not to be found only in 
the dominance of the pleasure principle, but also in the return through repetition of 
the conservative drives of the death drive, that is, through différance. This return 
involves the binding of absolute pleasure. At this point, as Freud points out, no 
account is taken of unpleasure.125 The pleasure principle or the master (which can be 
taken to also stand for Ernst and Freud), ‘is not the master, subject or author of this 
speculation. It is only charged with this mission, an emissary, a facteur, one might 
almost say a courtier.’126 This life-death stricture is not however restricted to Freud 
and Ernst, and by extension to human beings. One could say that all organisms, 
organisations and institutions (as well as their functioning) are a consequence of 
absolute pleasure limiting itself.127 Derrida’s analysis of Ernst’s game(s), as we can see 
from the above, shows that Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle and consequently 
also psychoanalysis as an institution has an erasure of desire at its ‘origin’ which 
disrupts what appears to be a teleological auto-institution.128 As was contended in the 
preceding subsection, the same could be said in relation to legal systems.  
In considering repetition or law-conserving violence we also need to remind ourselves 
of the ‘notion’ of iterability that was explored briefly above in relation to language. In 
the second part of Force of Law, Derrida seeks to complicate the Benjaminian 
distinction between law-making, law-enacting or law-founding violence/power 
(rechtsetzende Gewalt) on the one hand and law-preserving violence/power 
(rechtserhaltende Gewalt) on the other.129 Benjamin himself later acknowledges in 
his discussion of the death penalty and of the police, that this distinction is not a rigid 
one.130 Law-founding violence/power, Derrida notes, is already enveloped by the need 
for its conservation, in other words, because of the need for repetition.131 In the first 
part of Force of Law, he had already pointed out that law always implies its 
enforceability, and that the latter is therefore not something secondary to law.132 Law 
founding entails the positing of what is believed should be conserved; it therefore 
entails the promise of its own repetition in future, the sharing of a heritage and a 
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tradition.133 There can thus be no purity in the founding of law.134 The same applies to 
conservation: the conservation of law cannot be strictly distinguished from the 
founding of law as it re-founds and conserves.135 Whereas Benjamin however seeks to 
return to a pure origin, a presence without representation, Derrida seeks to draw the 
consequences of this structure of contamination.136  
This structure is shown implicitly in Benjamin’s analysis of the police, who as 
Benjamin points out, is supposed to only conserve law, but also founds, enacts or 
produces law. Because of this mixing of functions and also because they are 
everywhere, the power or violence of the police is described by Benjamin/Derrida as 
phantom-like or spectral.137 In spite of the institution of democracy and the principle 
of separation of powers, the police make regulations themselves and in doing this, set 
new goals which are not provided for in law.138 This is to be compared, Benjamin 
says, with the position in an absolute monarchy where the police represent a ruler in 
whom legislative and executive powers are united. The police in modern states also 
act in situations where no legal basis exists for doing so. The police therefore, strictly 
speaking, completely or absolutely (literally, ‘throughout’) [durchaus] act outside the 
law.139 Derrida, in a passage added to the second version of Force of Law, elaborates 
on this with reference specifically to modern technology and the consequent ubiquity 
of the police, their ability and authority to intrude in every sphere.140 This constitutes 
an internal degeneration of the democratic principle: police power is intended to 
protect democracy, but is essentially uncontrollable in its technological autonomy.141 
Law and democracy through the need for police powers thus destroy themselves. The 
police, we could also say, deprive law of its strength and its authority, its force, 
‘dooming it to a sort of self-persecuting disidentification’.142 The concept of law must 
therefore be understood as being ‘double’, because if it was only force and authority 
itself,143 it would not have been possible for it to loose force and authority.144 The 
ghostly double or spectral duplicity that Derrida invokes here refers to his analysis in 
Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question, where in a reading of Heidegger he shows 
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that the concept of spirit is double, both preserving and destroying itself, in a 
differantial relation with its ‘self’ and its ‘other’, we could add.145 Spirit, in the latter 
respect, is closely associated with fire, not of the hearth, but of burning itself, setting 
fire to itself, conflagrating itself.146 When Derrida refers to the Fort-Dasein of the 
police he therefore points not only to his analysis of Ernst’s game in Freud’s Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle, but also to the fact that even though the police destroy law, the 
polis nevertheless has to rely on the police for the conservation of law.147 Derrida’s 
statement, following Benjamin, that ‘[t]here is something decayed or rotten in law, 
which condemns it or ruins it in advance’, must be understood in the above 
context.148 The correlation with the role of the conservative drives in Freud’s model 
described above, as seeking to make the organism die its own death, but at the same 
time and primarily being satellites of the death drive, should be obvious.149  
Derrida can be agreed with when he contends that the same can be said in relation to 
the consequences of all law enforcement whether or not it belongs to the institution of 
the police.150 This can be understood as a reference to the broad discretionary or 
interpretive powers granted to officials in modern legal systems which is usually 
justified with reference to the inability of parliaments to regulate everything in detail, 
the unpredictability of future situations, and the need for flexibility in the taking of 
decisions.151 This nevertheless means that those who enforce the law (and ultimately 
the constitution) make what purport to be legal rules or decisions but which are not 
authorised by ‘law’, or are authorised only insofar as the authorisation ‘perverts’ law. 
They in other words found, create or produce ‘law’ and therefore also violence which 
can only be said to be authorised by law insofar as it can at the same time be said that 
law authorises its own abolition.152 Administrative law (as well as criminal 
procedure), which through the laying down of requirements of legality or grounds of 
review, inter alia seeks to ensure that officials act within their powers or according to 
certain procedures, can from this perspective be seen as a modern response to this 
‘degeneration’ of law. Administrative-law cases however show that the purpose(s) of a 
law, as well as the scope of the powers and duties laid down, are hardly ever easily 
determinable. Judges furthermore often defer in varying degrees to the substantive 
and procedural decisions taken by administrators which leave further scope for the 
creation of ‘law’ by the administration. More recently, privatisation, deregulation, and 
attempts at achieving the ends of government through state contracts, public 
procurement, public-private partnerships, self-regulation, and public participation, 
have given a new dimension to this ‘degradation’ of law.153  
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The above brief analysis is of course not meant as criticism of the grant of 
discretionary powers in modern legal systems or of constitutional and administrative 
law in general or to suggest that there should be a return to some ‘pure’ state of law. 
Modern states can hardly function without these institutions. Derrida can also not be 
read as saying that administrative and constitutional law, also in their other attempts 
to structure discretion or to ensure ‘good’ decision-making, do not place more or less 
effective limits on the exercise of discretionary powers. His analysis would also not 
deny that limits are often imposed in constitutional democracies as to the permissible 
extent of parliamentary delegation of powers.154 Derrida, reading Benjamin, seeks to 
show and to draw consequences from the fact that the state cannot any longer, or 
perhaps never could, achieve its purposes through the legal order itself; a supplement 
is always required. This supplement, however, as we saw above, necessarily leads to 
the abolition or degeneration of law because of the indeterminacy that is involved in 
interpretation and enforcement.155 Because of the co-implication of law 
founding/making and law enforcement, the (legal) validity of both is undermined. 
The abyss of this destruction points to an ‘origin’ of law which precedes the idea of 
origin as auto-institution. This destruction would in other words not have been 
possible if it was not already inscribed within the origin of law. Any ‘conception’ of 
law must consequently also make provision for its perversion, its auto-deconstruction 
or autoimmunity through repetition, not only as an accident, but as its condition of 
possibility, its pre-origin; iterability in other words.156 
Returning now to Ernst’s game and its relation to law-conserving violence, as we saw, 
Freud ultimately decides that the pleasure principle is at the origin of this game. 
Derrida, on the other hand, contends that Ernst’s game, but also Freud’s Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle (and, with reference to Force of Law, also law), are set in motion 
as well through a return of absolute desire, of self-destruction. Pure presence is never 
possible as life is always haunted by the desire for destruction, for absolute pleasure. 
The founding of law, one could also say, following Benjamin, is made possible by that 
which threatens its ruin.157 In the conservation of law and therefore in every act of 
interpretation, there is also a return of the mystical, of justice, of what Benjamin 
would refer to as the general political strike. This is the case even though there is a 
performative violence at the heart of every interpretive reading and even though 
interpretation is never neutral and never non-violent as it depends on the established 
order that it interprets.158 We could compare with the above the tendency in 
contemporary constitutional thinking to contemplate the order of law and its 
interpretation simply in terms of a discourse of self-legitimation.159 Derrida’s 
contention in Force of Law and other texts is that this is a result of the privilege that 
has been accorded to presence in Western philosophy which has in turn led to a 
privileging of that which is related to it, that is, the self, the home, property, and the 
nation. As indicated above, the desire for presence has to pass through language as 
well as through law which are not continuations of presence, but disruptive of 
presence, of the self, the home, property, and the nation.  
 
c)  Singularity 
                                                 
154
 See in this respect Schuppert (note 67), 553-557. 
155
 See also Schuppert (note 67), 559-565 on the independence of the administration in enforcing legislation and 
the important role of the executive in the enactment of legislation. 
156
 Force of Law (2),  290, Force of Law (1), 55 
157
 Force of Law (2), 278, Force of Law (1), 44 
158
 Force of Law (2), 270-271, Force of Law (1), 36-37 
159
 See Schuppert (note 67), 743-791 for a discussion of some of these approaches. 
  
18 
 
 
In seeking to spell out the implications of Force of Law, great importance has been 
attached to the notion of singularity in Derrida’s thinking by (legal) scholars in 
especially the English-speaking world, more specifically by those sympathetic to his 
thinking.160 In most of these readings singularity and the other have been placed in 
opposition to law’s generality. Whereas in some of these versions every party in a 
court case who loses as well as convicted criminals (the excluded other of the system) 
have been regarded as (singular) others, in other versions (usually by also invoking 
Levinas) all those who are marginalised or in a position of suffering have been 
regarded as the (singular) other. In these and related approaches, law has often on 
the basis of Force of Law been denounced for its generality and (representational) 
violence and therefore its inability to do justice. This denouncement has then usually 
been followed by calls for a model of decision-making which would concern itself with 
the singular other(s) (that is, the parties) in a court case rather than law, an approach 
which has sometimes been referred to as an ethics of difference. In similar vein, Force 
of Law has been read as emphasising contingency, openness or responsiveness and 
the need for decision-makers to take personal responsibility for their decisions, rather 
than hiding behind or seeking to justify their decisions solely with reference to the 
law. In some versions the emphasis on singularity has furthermore been accompanied 
by a call for an attempt at reconciliation of the different interests in a legal dispute 
and in light of the impossibility thereof, an acknowledgement of sacrifice. Reliance 
has inter alia been placed on the following passages in support of such readings: 
 
An address is always singular, idiomatic, and justice, as law, seems always to suppose 
the generality of a rule, a norm or a universal imperative. How to reconcile the act of 
justice that must always concern singularity, individuals, groups, irreplaceable 
existences, the other or myself as other, in a unique situation, with rule, norm, value, 
or the imperative of justice that necessarily have a general form, even if this 
generality prescribes a singular application in each case? 
 
To address oneself to the other in the language of the other is both the condition of all 
possible justice, it seems, but, in all rigor, it appears not only impossible (since I 
cannot speak the language of the other except to the extent that I appropriate it and 
assimilate it according to the law [loi] of an implicit third) but even excluded by 
justice as law, inasmuch as justice as law seems to imply an element of universality, 
the appeal to a third party who suspends the unilaterality or singularity of the 
idioms.161 
 
These passages make one understand why the interpretations mentioned above 
where law is opposed to singularity, the latter being equated with justice, have been 
so popular in readings of Force of Law. The multiple use of the word ‘seems’ in these 
passages as well as the question mark at the end of the first passage should however 
call on us to take care.162 To understand what is involved in Derrida’s use of the 
notion of singularity we should also not stop reading here. Especially towards the end 
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of the second part of Force of Law it becomes clear that Derrida is, in the above 
passages, invoking a Benjaminian distinction between singularity on the one hand 
and generality or representation on the other.163 This corresponds with Benjamin’s 
view that the originary destination of language was appellation, nomination, the 
giving or the appeal or presence of the name, that is, that language is originally not a 
means to an end.164 Benjamin’s thinking about singularity is clearly tied to a thinking 
which privileges presence, as opposed to representation.165 At the same time, as 
Derrida points out, Benjamin acknowledges that the language of communication and 
representation cannot be clearly distinguished from that of expression.166 Benjamin 
also acknowledges, as we saw above, that the founding of law cannot be clearly 
distinguished from its conservation. It should be clear with reference to what Derrida 
has termed a general strategy of deconstruction that the above quoted passages 
cannot be read or invoked as the ‘final outcome’ of a strategy of deconstruction, but 
are instead testimony to the first ‘phases’ of such a strategy.167 Derrida is contending 
in these passages of Force of Law that there is a seeming tension between the 
requirement of justice of relating to someone as other in a purely idiomatic way (for 
example through the proper name), in other words without the intervention of 
language viewed as a means to an end, and the other requirement of justice – 
generality or universality as characteristics of law and language. As in other contexts 
(for example, the event, the date, the invention, a performative speech act), Derrida is 
concerned here with showing that there can be no pure event, pure idiom, pure 
invention, pure performative, as there is always already, from the first moment, 
representation, repetition, mechanization, and technology.168  
This seemingly paradoxical situation requires another strategic ‘phase’ namely the 
inscription of the opposition within a new ‘concept’, ‘thereby disorganizing the entire 
inherited order and invading the entire field’.169 We saw above how this re-inscription 
takes place in Force of Law with reference to the ‘concept’ of justice, which is no 
longer a concept in the traditional sense as it exceeds economy.170 Derrida speaks in 
this regard of justice in the sense of ‘a responsibility without limits, and so necessarily 
excessive, incalculable, before memory’, an experience of inadequation or an 
incalculable disproportion, as a gift without exchange, and with reference to Levinas 
as absolute dissymmetry.171 It is necessary to determine the implications of this re-
inscription for singularity. What Derrida’s analysis of law and justice shows (and the 
above quoted passages already indicate this) is that the technicality or generality of 
law is not a negative accident, something that happens by accident to law, but that it 
is part of its structure. This structure, as we saw above with reference to law-founding 
and law-preserving violence, furthermore points to that which makes law possible – 
(unconditional) justice. When we take account of some of Derrida’s other texts on the 
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concept or notion of singularity we can see that singularity is, similar to law, but 
almost imperceptibly, deconstructed in Force of Law, in a movement away from 
presence towards a thinking of singularity in terms of the unconditional.172 The 
relation between justice/the unconditional and singularity for example comes to the 
fore in Derrida’s discussion of unlimited hospitality which he refers to as the ‘unique 
and singular and absolutely only great Law of hospitality’ requiring an unconditional 
welcome.173 This thinking of singularity is of course still related to law, but requires a 
new relation between justice, law and singularity. This relation does not consist in 
opposing a specific party or even all the parties in a court case to the law, but in 
something – a differantial relation we could say - beyond this opposition. Derrida 
makes this clear also when he discusses the three examples of the impossible 
experience of aporia in Force of Law and when he says that a judge cannot, if he 
wants to do justice, simply apply a rule to a case; there has to be a suspension or 
destruction of law, and a reinvention in each case. This is because ‘[e]ach case is 
other, each decision is different and requires an absolutely unique interpretation 
which no existing, coded rule can or ought to guarantee absolutely’.174  
It may still be contended that there are many passages in Force of Law where Derrida 
refers to the other and that this indicates the importance for deconstruction of 
singularity. There can be little doubt as to the importance of singularity for 
deconstruction/justice. The question is how to understand these references to the 
other. In discussing the second aporia, Derrida for example notes that the infinite 
idea of justice is ‘irreducible, irreducible because owed to the other, owed to the other, 
before any contract, because it has come, it is a coming [parce qu’elle est venue], the 
coming of the other as always other singularity’.175 This passage, and others that may 
be referred to, should similarly not be read out of context.176 A rigorous reading of 
this passage in Force of Law would note that it is immediately followed in the same 
paragraph by a reflection on justice in terms of the gift without exchange and the 
desire for justice. The passage in question where the coming of the other is invoked 
can perhaps be understood better when we take account of Derrida’s reflections 
elsewhere on the concept of the event, which is often used to describe the coming of 
the other.177 When Derrida speaks of the third aporia (urgency) in Force of Law, he 
for example invokes the notion of justice that remains to come. He continues as 
follows: 
 
“Perhaps” - one must [il faut] always say perhaps for justice. There is an avenir for 
justice and there is no justice except to the degree that some event is possible which, 
as event, exceeds calculation, rules, programs, anticipations and so forth. Justice, as 
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the experience of absolute alterity, is unpresentable, but it is the chance of the event 
and the condition of history.178 
 
Derrida’s other texts on the concept of the event shows that the event has a similar 
structure as was described above in respect of singularity.179 The incalculability of 
justice (as of other concepts such as friendship, democracy, and the gift) is what 
allows for a new thinking of the event, and of the future.180 It is in other words only 
when we are ‘prepared’ by way of a deconstructed concept of justice, hospitality, 
friendship, democracy and the gift to encounter that which comes with a certain 
defenselessness or exposure, without mastery and without sovereignty, without 
horizon of expectation, that the future has a chance.181 This is to be compared with a 
situation where the future is approached from the perspective of determinate 
concepts (also of justice) which have been constructed from a thinking of presence 
and which through their totalizing horizon closes us off from that which comes. 
Responsibility, Derrida says elsewhere, requires that the other take the decision in 
me.182 Derrida’s thinking about the event, which is clearly related to the death drive, 
the desire for absolute pleasure or what he would later call autoimmunity, goes 
beyond humanism as it involves an openness to whatever or whoever comes. As 
should be clear, this openness and exposure still involves singularity, but without 
being tied to presence.183  
It should also be evident that the above structure does not leave us with relativism, in 
other words with no criterion to choose between the interests of the different parties 
to a dispute, with a reconciliation of interests as the only option. At the same time it 
does not provide us with a criterion of judging, at least not in the traditional sense. 
The discussion of the notion of undecidability below will make this clear. It also does 
not mean that a court should simply always decide in favour of those who can be 
regarded as ‘suffering others’. Much more is required if a judge is to be responsible in 
this hyperbolic sense. As we saw above, every act of conservation and therefore every 
act of interpretation invokes the possibility of a general strike. In other words, the 
pre-origin of law, which entails incalculable disproportion and a loss or an 
expropriation of the proper, of property, of economy, of rights, lies at the ‘origin’ of 
every interpretation. Justice therefore requires that a judge should give him/herself 
and the law up to the impossible decision, while taking account of law and rules.184 
Derrida uses the latter description of decision-making in the context of speaking 
about the second aporia of undecidability. As he makes clear there, undecidability is 
not merely about an oscillation or tension between two different interpretations of 
the same rule or between the universality of law and the singularity of a unique 
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situation.185 The question this raises is whether undecidability is another name for 
justice. This appears to be the case from the heading of this section - ‘Second Aporia: 
The Haunting of the Undecidable’ - and when Derrida speaks of the ‘moment of 
suspense of the undecidable’, in other words, that which happens in the impossible 
experience of aporia or justice.186 This understanding of the undecidable seems to be 
confirmed by the following passage: 
 
Once the test and ordeal of the undecidable has passed (if that is possible, but this 
possibility is not pure, it is never like an other possibility: the memory of the 
undecidability must keep a living trace that forever marks a decision as such), the 
decision has again followed a rule, a given, invented or reinvented, and reaffirmed 
rule: it is no longer presently just, fully just.187 
 
The above passage nonetheless also refers to the contamination between justice and 
law and it seems to imply that the notion of undecidability is not unaffected by this 
contamination. In the second part of the essay Derrida confirms this contamination 
when he elaborates on Benjamin’s notion of undecidability.188 Benjamin refers to 
divine justice beyond law and the state as decidable (referring in this way inter alia to 
the destruction of law by divine justice), yet as without decidable knowledge. In other 
words, divine violence does not lend itself to human determination or knowledge or 
decidable certainty.189 Law and the state, although it is itself paralyzed by 
undecidability (conserving violence having to repress counter-violence) is the place of 
decidable knowledge. It is in other words subject to human determination. Derrida 
does not oppose these forms of violence or power like Benjamin at some point does, 
but instead emphasises the need to participate in both.190 This is because there is no 
pure moment of undecidable justice, but always a differantial relation between 
(undecidable) justice and (decidable) law, a relation which needs to be negotiated in 
singular instances. While justice does not therefore simply demand a concern for 
suffering or marginalised others, this structure of law and justice should, depending 
on whether the decision-maker indeed gives him- or herself over to the impossible 
decision (undecidable justice), in most instances lead to an invention of law which 
favours those who are ‘marginalised’. The qualification ‘most’ is added, because as the 
discussion below will show, justice is not to be confused with the desires of those who 
have nationalist, ethnic, racist, linguistic, xenophobic, religious fundamentalist and 
other similar aspirations, even though those who propagate these views often believe 
themselves to be ‘marginalised’. The latter are desires for presence, whereas justice as 
we know, stands in a differantial relation to the desire for presence.  
 
d) The death drive and good/evil  
 
The relation between justice and what Derrida refers to in Force of Law as the bad 
and the worst often raises concern in legal debates.191 Similarly, the notion of the 
diabolical that Derrida repeatedly invokes in the context of the death drive could 
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easily be understood in such a way that the death drive is viewed as something that 
should be avoided as if it was an evil to be equated with fascism. This is not the 
case.192 As the above discussion should already have made clear, the death drive 
concerns a return to the inorganic state of an organism or an organisation, a desire 
for self-destruction. It therefore entails a turn against the self. This is no doubt 
something dangerous; yet justice requires that it is not something to be simply 
avoided, but indeed to be affirmed, which at the same time does not mean that it 
should be embraced.193 In Derrida’s texts, the death drive finds expression also in the 
‘notions’ of absolute hospitality, forgiveness, the gift, and autoimmunity, all of which 
involve a turn against the interests of the self, the state, or the law. Derrida’s use of 
the terms ‘the worst’, ‘evil’, and ‘monstrosity’ should as always be viewed within the 
context that they appear.194 At times these terms are used to refer to the future 
anterior (the future that comes (from the) back or from behind) which could be 
viewed as another term for what in the present context we have referred to as the 
‘return to the inorganic’.195 When used as such, this usually goes hand in hand with a 
call for justice or a hyper-politics or hyper-ethics of the impossible where the subject 
or the state will no longer be in control.196 At other times, Derrida uses terms such as 
‘evil’ and ‘the worst’ to refer to and as an evaluation of the calculation which 
necessarily follows from justice as its condition of possibility. References to evil or the 
worst then serve as a reference to the holocaust197 or to conservative politics,198 used 
as a call for political engagement,199 or relied on to say that without risking evil no 
chance will be given to justice.200 Derrida’s statement in Force of Law must therefore 
be understood in context:  
 
Abandoned to itself, the incalculable and giving (donatrice) idea of justice is always 
very close to the bad, even to the worst for it can always be reappropriated by the 
most perverse calculation. It is always possible, and this is part of the madness of 
which we were speaking. An absolute assurance against this risk can only saturate or 
suture the opening of the call to justice, a call that is always wounded. But 
incalculable justice commands calculation.201  
 
Derrida is clearly not saying here that this ‘idea’ of justice is in itself bad or the worst. 
This would of course not have been ‘wrong’ to say from the perspective of the self as 
this idea of justice requires absolute or just hospitality and thus self-destruction.202 
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Nevertheless Derrida is here pointing out that justice needs law and that there are 
different (better and worse) ways of calculating law. He is calling for an engagement 
in juridico-political battles.203 A brief analysis of Derrida’s discussion of the relation 
between the death drive and sadism, referred to above, might clarify things further. 
Sadism belongs to the ego drives and the sexual drives.204 This is also the case with 
masochism, which Freud describes as a component drive complementary to sadism 
and which turns back towards one’s own proper ego.205 Sadism is connected to the 
violent exercise of power, to domination; it is a drive for power.206 What sadism 
shows, Derrida contends, is that the pleasure principle is also a drive for power. The 
drive for power and sadism must thus not be confused with the death drive or the 
repetition compulsion.207 Like all the drives, the drive for power (and thus also 
sadism) derives from the need to restore to an earlier state of things.208 The drive for 
power (and sadism) is consequently firstly a satellite of death; the death drive and the 
repetition compulsion necessarily overflow power.209  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The above analysis has sought to show the importance of the Freudian death drive 
and of Derrida’s reflections on the law of language for an understanding of Force of 
Law. The life-death stricture that Derrida describes in To Speculate – On Freud and 
which is repeated (differently) in Force of Law puts in question self-government and 
autonomy as the dominant features of democratic constitutionalism. By pointing to 
the ‘mystical’ or erased memory trace of a death drive or unbounded desire in 
institutions such as a legal order, it calls on us to recognise a pre-origin which is not 
subject to mastery and which disrupts the idea of an institution as possession. The 
death drive read with Derrida’s exploration of the law of language furthermore puts in 
question the idea of law as calculation prevalent in constitutional democracies. 
Calculation here refers not only to the use of strict legalistic methods of constitutional 
interpretation, but also procedural and value oriented approaches with reference to 
open-ended concepts such as human dignity or the common good. It was contended 
above that in every repetition or act of self-conserving violence, the law opens itself to 
unconditional justice. In calculating, a decision-maker is therefore by virtue of the 
structural functioning of desire necessarily also exposed to the impossible or to 
unconditional justice, that is, a loss of property, of rights, of economy, of meaning, of 
reason, of sovereignty, of citizenship. Only in this exposure is there a chance for 
decision, for responsibility, which would not simply involve a return of the law to 
itself. Unconditional justice ‘is’ beyond good and evil, and it calls for negotiation in 
singular instances to prevent this desire from being nothing at all as well as from 
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being appropriated by the worst, but not without affirmation of the impossible, of 
death as the impossible. 
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